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Petitioner, Respondent James W. Burneson (“Burneson”) here by files this Petition for Writ of Certiorari as follows:

A. The Commission and the Appellant Court erred in finding the denial of an extension of two days to allow Respondent to file his Exception not frivolous and groundless. At no time was the Respondent ever asked any questions about his illness to better determine if it would be a reason to grant the extension. The decision to deny was decided by Mr. Foreman and the Commissioners were obligated to support the blunder of their Director Ms. Campagnola by confirming her unauthorized denial to grant the extension a month later.

(The Judicial Industry found the one day late filing to be an excuse to hide the wrongful actions of Attorney General’s Adversary Counsel Mr. Richard Foreman to violate his authority in advising the Director of Real Estate Commission to make a ruling she has no authority to make. This action was self serving to Mr. Foreman’s efforts to win a decision against the Respondent James W. Burneson.)

B. Did the Commission and Appellant Court err when the Director of the Real Estate Commission denied Respondent’s request for a 2 day extension to file his exceptions without the appointment of a Conflict Counsel that should immediately been appointed to give advice to the Commissioners on whether to grant this request instead of Mr. Foreman writing the denial for the Director to sign without authority on January 9 2004 two days after the January 5^th date the extension was due. Conflict Counsel Mr. Tom Roan was appointed February 4. 2004.

C. Did the Commission and the Appellant Court err by deny Respondents rights to be heard at the Real Estate Commission hearing February 4, 2005? Yet the Commission heard from Mr. Foreman Adversary Counsel and the newly appointed Conflict Counsel Mr. Tom Roan. See Defendant’s exhibit 2 (Plaintiffs) corrected to read Respondent’s Opening Brief. Paragraph 2.

D. The Administrative Law Judge, Commissioners and Appellant Court erred when deciding a thief occurred when no proof of any money was stolen. Funds claimed to be missing by Plaintiff’s (Stonehenge Owners Association) were dropped on the Order to Seal by District Judge Sylvester. The files relating to this case were Ordered Sealed. (From that point on there is no proof of any violation of the Real Estate Commission Rules that is admissible by the Administrative Law Judge Coughlin of any charges against Petitioner Burneson. With the sealing of the case all evidence of any missing funds is inadmissible and this case should have been dismissed. This is an err on the part of all parties against Respondent in this case.

E. Did the Appellant Court err by not reading the entire file from Notice of Appeal to Plaintiff/Appellant’s Opening Brief? There are multiple issues ignored by the Senior Judge Hume in the list of issues of the Open Notice of Appeal and Respondent’s Opening Brief.

F. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari must be reviewed by all 7 justices on the Supreme Court of Colorado as per the attached letter issued by Chief Judge Malarkey dated February 2, 2005. A review must include the reading to the file starting with the trial in the Administrative Law Court to the final hearing of the Real Estate Commission.

Please note there has been an err in the printing of respondent’s opening brief filed September 7, 2004. The miss label is “Plaintiff/appellant’s opening brief which should read “Respondent/appellant’s opening brief. This err is easily recognized by all parties to this Petition.

II. REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE OPINION OR JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF THE COURT

Burneson seeks to appeal the Opinion dated September 8, 2005 in which the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Trial court. A copy of that Opinion is provide the Court in the Appendix to this a Petition. .

III. STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED

Petitioner Burneson seeks review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated September 8, 2005. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to C.A.R. 49 and C.R.S. No orders respecting a rehearing date were sought or provided and there have been no requests for an extension of time with respect to this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

1. A copy of Colorado Court of Appeals Order was scanned into a computer and then comments were added by Burneson typed in red. This Order by Senior Judge Hume was prepared without line numbers for easy reference to a page and line for Burneson’s review. A copy of the original Order is provided this court in the appendix to be compared with the scanned copy.

2. The length of this document has been increased to over 26 pages with the inclusion of the Order by Judge Hume Court which was typed in a font of 15 double spaced (Word count 4,395). Judge Hume’s Order contributed 11 pages to Petitioner’s Brief. The Judge’s Order should be considered a quote and not be counted as part of the limit of 12 typed pages of a Writ of Certiorari. Only the print in red is to be a part of the 12 page limit along with the balance of the Writ of table of contents of I through VI. (Word count 2,596.)

3. This method of inserting comments by the Petitioner should prove easier for the court’s review and less confusing since there is no reference of lines to pages in the Appellant’s Order.

4. If this effort to simplify the facts as they relate to Judge Hume’s Order by interjecting Burneson’s comments is not accepted by this Court then upon notice Burneson will redo the entire Petition and extract all comments in red and cut and paste on a separate document.

5. Notice to the court this entire appeal and petition for Writ of Certiorari will be published on the Internet at www.court-house.com after all litigation is completed. This offering on the Internet is not the same as publication to be cited as a legal document in future cases.

6. A letter dated February 2, 2005 by Chief Justice Mullarkey is included in the appendix of this Petition. Reference to a previous Appeal is made where all seven justices are claimed to have reviewed case number 04SC379. Since this service is claimed to have been provided in a previous case it is the request of Burneson Petitioner that this Petition also be reviewed by all seven justices.

In the past when new methods were developed to put words to paper from Ink and Quill to pen, typewriter and now computer are all improvements of the system of reporting documents. It is a suggestion the inserting of comments typed in red or other colors will cut down paper and add to the better understanding of the facts in a case.

In this Petition Burneson seeks review of parts of the Order from the Court of Appeals that prove the files, Motions and court documents were not reviewed by the Appellant Senior Judge Hume. The errors committed by Judge Hume are indicated by comments inserted in red print by Burneson.

To accomplish this task the Appellant Court Order has prepared in the following manor:

This document was scanned into a computer file to allow comments to be inserted to reduce the paper and simplify the facts as they relate to this Order.

Court of Appeals No.: 04CA0807

ORDER AFFIRMED

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Mary E. Risko, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Forman, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3h and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2004.

Respondent, James W. Burneson, appeals the order of the Real Estate Commission (commission) of the State of Colorado revoking his real estate broker's license. We affirm the order.

Respondent, James W. Burneson Pro Se appeals the Order of eth Real Estate Commission of the State of Colorado Revoking his real estate broker license

In 1980, Burneson, a licensed real estate broker, was the developer of twenty-three townhomes designed for use as office space. Insert in red print by Burneson.

“Towne Offices” is the name of the units they were never townhouses. Statement “Burneson, a licensed real estate broker insinuates the development was performed by Denver 1500 the licensed broker company of Burneson which is untrue.

The town home towne office owners shared joint expenses for general building and ground maintenance through an owners' association (association). Burneson initially served as president, director, and manager of the association.

In 1992, Burneson President of Stonehenge Towne Office Association advised the association members that the roofs needed to be replaced on the town homes “towne office and requested the approval of a special assessment. The members approved an assessment ranging from $90 to $120 per month per townhouse, which was to continue until $36,000 had been raised for the roof replacements. As president of the association, Burneson opened an escrow savings account at a local bank in order to deposit funds received. Licensed Broker Burneson of licensed brokerage company Denver 1500 Inc. never collected any money in its company account and then transferred funds to Stonehenge Towne Office Association. The license of broker Burneson was never used in all the years of service for any business needs of Stonehenge Towne Office Association. (16 years)

Although approximately $28,000 had been collected from members and deposited in the escrow savings account between 1992 and 1994, only one roof had been replaced by the fall of 1996.

The association members became concerned and requested copies of all books and records from Burneson, which he refused to provide.

A new board of directors and officers were elected who eventually obtained access to the escrow savings account records, which indicated that the account only had a balance of $50.83.

From the bank records, the board discovered that President of Stonehenge not Broker Burneson had transferred $25,580 from the escrow savings account to his personal bank account and distributed an additional $3,450 to other recipients. When confronted, Burneson informed the board that the $28,000 had been used to pay for the roof repairs in full. The board discovered that Burneson's representations were inaccurate when the roofing contractor filed a mechanic's lien against the association based on nonpayment for roofing materials.

In 1997, the association filed a lawsuit against Burneson in district court, with the District Attorney of Arapahoe County criminal charges which was dismissed when the association received a restitution check in the amount of $28,500. District Judge Sylvester issued an Order to Seal the Record on July 10, 2002 (see defendant’s Exhibit B contained in Burneson’s Notice of Appeal) and this action was removed from the records of Arapahoe District Court and there is no criminal history of any money missing. ALJ Coughlin refused to acknowledge this Order and proceeded with a trial against Burneson for violating Colorado Real Estate Rules. The Order to seal states “no such action ever occurred and that no such record exists.” Where does an ALJ have the authority to ignore this District Court Order to seal an action she claims still exists.

In September 2001, the commission served Burneson with a notice of charges and notice of hearing. The notices advised Burneson that a hearing would be held to determine whether

discipline should be imposed against him for violations of § 12-61-113(g), (g.5), (k), (n), and (t), C.R.S. 2004, and commission rules E1, E-1(f) and (g), E-2, and E-3.

A two-day evidentiary hearing was conducted by an administrative law judge (ALJ) on March 23 and 24, 2003. The ALJ issued an initial decision on:-September 30, 2003, in which she concluded that Burneson's conduct violated § 12-61-113(1) (g), (g.5), (k), and (t) and commission rules E-1, E-2, and E-3. The initial decision was mailed to Burneson on October 20, 2003. During this trial multiple actions by Mr. Richard Foreman and ALJ Coughlin violated Burneson’s rights to due process of the law. There was no transcript of the trial since Burneson could not afford the payment of over $2,900. The Plaintiff didn’t order a copy of the transcript since it would have proven all the claims of a mistrial by Burneson. But Senior Judge Hume failed to read the two motions that are a part the court record Defendant’s exhibit G and H in Respondent/Appellant’s Opening Brief. ALJ Coughlin did not rule on these motions until she ruled on the trial and then she denied them out of hand without any explanation. These motions prove all the actions of a mistrial without a transcript which were ignored by Senior Judge Hume.

On November 11, 2003, Burneson requested a sixty-day extension to file exceptions. The commission extended the deadline to January 5, 2004, for both parties to file exceptions.

The commission timely filed its exceptions, which included a request to strike Conclusion of Law No. 5 from the initial decision and replace it with the conclusion that Burneson violated § 12-61-113(1) (n), C.R.S. 2004.

On January 6, 2004, one day after the extended deadline for filing exceptions, Burneson filed a request to again extend the filing date for exceptions. The following day, Burneson filed his untimely exceptions. By one day late with the filing the entire judicial system came to an end, a dead halt. On January 9, 2004, the director of the commission

issued an order denying Burneson's motion to extend the filing deadline. This Order to deny an extension was written by Adversary Counsel Richard Foreman for Director Campagnola to sign dated January 9^th three days after date exceptions were declared late. Great bluff the Director didn’t have the authority to issue this Order only the Commissioner are authorized to grant or deny an extension. Richard Foreman had to know this fact but since he is running the entire Real Estate Commission to get Burneson the refusal to extend by 2 days prevent Burneson exposing all the wrongs committed in the trial if his Exception is denied. The Supreme Court Justices must read Burneson’s Exceptions to determine how justice has been denied by a one day late filing that was completed up by Burneson’s filing of the exceptions the next day.

Burneson subsequently filed several motions, including a motion to reconsider, motion to strike, and motion to be heard. What happened to these motions? One was a Motion to object to the Court Record and Add Documents to the Record. This Motion was denied by Chief Judge Davidson while this case was under appeal. This denial by an Appellant Chief Judge is grounds for an appeal to the Supreme Court of Colorado. How can a defendant obtain a fair trial when documents of the actions of Richard Foreman and others are denied to be a part of the record that proves Burneson’s complaint of being denied a one day extension? The Appellant Court erred by denying Respondent’s right to file documents pertaining to his appeal.

On March 4, 2004, the commission issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, in. which it _denied. all of Burneson's motions. The commission affirmed the AM's initial decision, except that, as relevant here, it adopted revised Conclusion of Law No. 5. As a result, the commission revoked Burneson's real estate broker's license. This appeal followed.

Burneson contends that the commission erred by denying his request to extend the filing date for his exceptions to the initial decision. We disagree.

To preserve a right of appeal in an administrative proceeding, a party must file timely exceptions to the ALJ's initial decision. In the absence of a timely exception, the initial decision shall become the final agency decision. Winterhawk Outfitters, Inc. v. Office of Outfitters Registration, 43 P.3d 745, 747 (Colo. App. 2002); see § 24-4- 105(14)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2004 (party must file exceptions to initial decision within thirty days after service unless extended by agency or unless agency initiates review upon its own motion within thirty days after service). One day extension denied is a frivolous refusal since no damage by granting the extension can be claimed by Plaintiff Real Estate Commission except the truth is allowed to be a part of this Appeal. Hiding the truth damages Burneson and hides the misconduct of an ALJ and an Attorney General Deputy Attorney. Due process of law was denied Respondent.

A decision whether to grant a timely request for an extension of time to file exceptions .is committed to the discretion of the administrative -agency. Section -24-4-105(14) (a) (II). This agency is controlled by Richard Foremen and the Commissioners are not impartial when they can be told how to vote in post hearings while the Defendant is denied his right to be heard by the Commissioners. Burneson was never allowed to be heard by the Commissioners even when he made an offer to settle with the Commissioners. The Adversary Counsel was the only one allowed to present his settlement as ruled by ALJ Coughlin behind closed doors not open to the public. The Attorney General gets all the communication with the Commission behind closed doors and the Respondent gets denied any communication. Isn’t this one sided? ( New Law)

In support of his untimely motion for extension to file exceptions, Burneson argued that his "request for extension [was necessary due to a clerical error and [because he] was incapacitated by the illness of the flu."

In denying his motion as untimely, the commission concluded that a party's miscalculation of a deadline did not constitute excusable neglect. In addition, the commission noted that Burneson had failed explain how his illness precluded him from preparing and filing his exceptions before January 5. Because Burneson failed to file exceptions to the initial decision by January 5, 2004, the extended deadline, he waived his statutory right to have the commission review his exceptions to the initial decision. See § 24-4-105(14) (a) (II). With respect to his ilness, we agree with the commission that Burneson failed to explain adequately how the flu prevented him from preparing his exceptions. See McCall v. Meyers, 94 P.3d 1271, 1272 (Colo. App. 2004) (court may consider only arguments and assertions supported by evidence in record). If no questions are asked about the illness there will be no record of the illness being valid. In three days from the missed date of filing and the refusal to grant an extension there was no time to determine if the illness was valid. Mr. Foreman refused the claim of illness out of hand with no valid facts it was not the cause for the delay of filing. The Commission had a month after Mr. Foreman’s unauthorized denial of the extension for the commission to validate or prove the illness was not a cause for the delay. The Commission did not open that door since it was their duty to protect their Director by ratifying her blunder of denying the extension. Any effort to clarify the facts surrounding the issue of illness could prove true and then the Commission could not protect the Director. Further, a division of this court has concluded that miscountingdays in determining when a filing is due-does not constitute excusable neglect Bosworth Data Servs., Inc. v. Gloss, 41 Colo. App. 530, 532, 587 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1978). Accordingly, we conclude that the commission did not err in denying Burneson's request to extend the deadline for filing exceptions to the initial decision.

Burneson contends that to be accountable under § 12-61- 113(1) (n), he was required to be in the employment of a client as a broker or facilitating a real estate transaction, and, therefore, he could not have violated the statute. We disagree.

In Hart v. Colorado Real Estate Commission, 702 P.2d 763, 765 (Colo. App. 1985), a division of this court concluded that the commission had authority to discipline real estate agents for related activities that did not require a license. Accordingly, Burneson was not required to be in the employment of a client as a broker or

facilitating a real estate transaction to be accountable under § 12- 61-113(1) (n).

A copy of this case is provided the Court in the Appendix as proof Senior Judge Hume misrepresents the point of law that a “real estate agent for related activities that did not require a license” can be disciplined by the Real Estate Commission. Mr. Hart had an exclusive right to sell listing contract with the seller for the sale of their property. During that listing contract Mr. Hart misrepresented facts to the sellers and caused problems by mistakes made while the listing contract was in force. After the listing contract expired Mr. Hart prepared a bridge loan and violated the rule of having his client make a payment of discount points on a VA loan. All of these acts were committed while Mr. Hart was acting as a listing agent for the sellers and or had a working relationship with the client. No where does this case law match the claims of Senior Judge Hume that a real estate sales man can be discipline for related activities that did not require a license. There is no case law that holds a business man liable to the Real Estate Commission for activities he performed outside the scope of a real estate broker. All business men under this theory could be held to the Real Estate Commission licensed law if by chance they are a licensed real estate broker and where the business acts did not require a real estate license. A broker licensed business man must have the freedom to perform in other businesses which don’t require a Real Estate License and not be under the jurisdiction of the Real Estate Commission rules. For a Senior Judge to quote this case law of Hart v Real Estate Commission to prove a point of law that a real estate salesman can be disciplined violations of Licensed law of the Real Estate Commission is a disgrace and an insult to average intelligence,

Burneson contends that the claimed violations of § 12-61-113 were not proved. We disagree. How can this court disagree when it has not noted, described, or quoted a document that proves any actions by Burneson were performed as a real estate broker and not as the Corporate Declarant and President of Stonehenge Towne Offices. The real estate licensed broker is recognized by IRS to be a separate entity from the President of Stonehenge Towne Offices Association which files a separate tax return from each other. They are not one in the same and the acts of one are not the acts of the other. Real Estate Commission believes the acts of President Burneson are the same acts of real estate broker Burneson. This gives the Real Estate Commission a second bite of the apple after the District Attorney of Arapahoe County had a bite and refused prosecution.

The failure to file timely exceptions results in the "waiver of the right to judicial review of the final order of such agency, unless that portion of such order subject to exception is different from the content of the initial decision." Section 24-4-105(14)(c), C.R.S. 2004; see State Bd. of Registration for ProflEng'rs & Prof I Land Surveyors v. Brinker, 948 P.2d 96, 98 (Colo. App. 1997). Burneson hand delivered copies of his Exceptions to the Commission the next day after the date required for delivery. Failure to deliver is one part of the requirement which Burneson did complete. The second requirement is on time and one day late causes harm to one party only and that’s Burneson being denied his right to a fair trial because the Advocate Attorney Mr. Richard Foremen made the decision without the authority to deny the exception. He prepared the written document to deny a one day extension to be signed by the Director Ms. Campagnola. This proved to be wrong when Burneson in written documents prove the Director has no authority to deny Burneson a one day extension. Burneson while delivering documents to the receiving clerks at the counter of the front desk of the Supreme Court of Colorado was advised policy has always been added three days to the date of required delivery to account for mailing whether mailed or hand delivered. That is the custom of the Supreme Court of Colorado add three days to a required date of delivery and it will be considered on time. If this custom and policy meets the rules of delivery to the Supreme Court of Colorado then it must apply to all agencies unless a three day mailing is specifically denied in some agencies statutes. ONE DAY LATE HAND DELIVERED TO BE DENIED IS DONE FOR OTHER REASONS THAN THE CLAIM TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT OF APPEAL IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING. This administrative proceeding didn’t collapse due to a one day delay in delivery since it took a month to make the denial by Mr. Foreman legal by the Commission ratifying the denial.

The commission concluded that it could only review the specific portions of the initial decision that were the subject of the timely exceptions filed by the attorney general on behalf of the commission. We agree. Accordingly, we may only review revised Conclusion of Law No. 5, which provided:

Demonstrated unworthiness or incompetency to act as a real estate broker. Based upon the foregoing factual findings, the Commission further has established a violation of section 12-61-113(1) (n) in that [Burneson]

"demonstrated unworthiness or incompetency to act as a real estate broker or salesperson by

conducting business in such a manner as to endanger the interest of the public." Contrary to [Burneson's] position, to establish a violation of this provision the Commission need not show that [Burneson] was actually engaged in activities requiring a real estate broker's license.

Richard Foreman claims without any evidence Burneson committed acts under Conclusion of Law No. 5 as a Judge with the authority of a Judge not an Adversary Counsel. His word is the law and thus Burneson is found guilty of this charge which ALJ Coughlin didn’t find him guilty. Foreman’s Order is in fact eh order of a Judge and the Commissioner never questioned this demand of Forman’s. The Conflict Counsel was never consulted on this miscarriage of justice by the Commission.

A reviewing court may reverse the decision of an administrative agency if the court finds that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, made a decision that is unsupported by the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its authority. Section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2004; Lawley v. Dep't of Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239, 1247 (Colo. 2001).

The issue for the reviewing court is not whether it would reach the same conclusion on the same facts. Rather, the legislature has directed the court to look at the whole record to determine whether the agency action is supportable. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n v. Hanegan, 947 P.2d 933, 936-37 (Colo. 1997). All reasonable doubt as to the correctness of the administrative body's ruling must be resolved in its favor. Unless an abuse of discretion is shown, the administrative determination will not be disturbed. Lawley, supra, 36 P.3d at 1252. The following quote is from the case law cited by the Senior Judge Hume which means he never read this case and the clerk screwed up by quoting it.

“Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion by an administrative board can arise in only three ways, namely: (1) by neglecting or refusing to use reasonable diligence and care to procure such evidence as it is by law authorized to consider in exercising the discretion vested in it; (2) by failing to give candid and honest consideration to evidence before it on which it is authorized to act; or (3) by exercising its discretion in such a manner as to indicate clearly that its action is based on conclusions from the evidence which reasonable persons fairly and honestly considering the evidence could not reach.” Lawley v. Dep't of Higher Educ., supra, 36 P.3d at 1252.

Mr. Foreman nor the Director or the Commission followed the three steps stated above before Mr. Foreman issued his order to deny Burneson’s motion for an extension of two days to file his Exceptions. This is material proof all parties from the Commissioner to the Director and especially Mr. Foreman acted in a Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion in deciding to deny Burneson’s motion for an extension of 2 days. Appellant Court erred by not reading their own case law which should have reversed the Appellant’s Order to confirm the Commissioners Order to

Abuse of discretion is proven by Mr. Foreman’s act of being the judge in deciding that ALJ Coughlin’s order be amended to charge Burneson with the claim he acted as Conclusion of Law 5. It’s amazing the power an Attorney General Deputy Adversary counsel has over this agency. (Judge, Director, Prosecutor and Jury) The Commissioners are not an independent board who is supposed to make decision on their own bases. They conform to the direction of any attorney who advises them.

Here, Burneson failed to provide this court with transcripts of the hearing held before the ALJ on March 23 and 24, 2003. This failure to provide the court with transcripts of the hearing before the ALJ was due to the lack of money to pay for it. The Attorney General’s Office could have provided copies of the trial but it would have proven Burneson is right about the issues of a mistrial so no transcript is provided to suppress the truth and the other reasons was lack of funds to purchase the transcript by Respondent. Richard Foreman claims again without any evidence Burneson

We are bound by the record presented and may only consider arguments and assertions supported by evidence in the record. A party cannot overcome a deficiency in, the record by statements in the briefs. McCall, supra, 94 P.3d at-1272. 'Further, pro se litigants are bound by the same rules of civil procedure as attorneys licensed to practice law in this state. Negron v. Golder, 111 P.3d 538, 541 (Colo. App. 2004). There are two documents which are just as good as a full transcript that are a part of the court record. These documents are referred to in Burneson’s Opening Brief marked Defendant’s Exhibit G and H.

Based on the record before us, which we must view in favor of the commission, we cannot conclude that the commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously, made a decision that is unsupported by the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or exceeded its authority in concluding that Burneson violated § 12-61-113(1)(n). See Lawley, supra. Therefore, we reject Burneson's argument that the commission erred in concluding that he violated § 12-61- 113(1) (n).

Burneson also contends that the order must be set aside because conflicts counsel was not appointed until after exceptions had been filed by the attorney general. Again, we disagree.

The office of the attorney .general is, required to serve as the commission's counsel as well as to prosecute charges before a hearing officer and provide representation in support of that officer's decisions. This does not mean Adversary Counsel makes the decision for the Commission and Director as proven herein. At the moment a decision is to be made by the Commission legal counsel in the form of Conflict Counsel must be appointed to provide legal advice to the Commissioners so they can be impartial during hearings. The Commissioners were prejudiced by having to ratify an action improperly taken by the Director to cover for her and Mr. Richard Foreman in denying Burneson’s request for an extension of one day a month later. The Commission did not ratify this order to deny base on any consideration of law or State Statute. Justice has been denied Burneson through out this entire litigation and needs to be corrected by granting this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

To avoid the appearance of impropriety and to maintain the integrity of the administrative process, the office has devised a "screening" policy, that is, the regulatory law sections and the conflicts counsel have been separated within the attorney general's office. Ranum v. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n, 713 P.2d 418, 420 (Colo. App. 1985).

In its order, the commission noted that conflicts counsel from the natural resources section had been appointed. But the appointment was not in a timely manor. The mere appointment of a Conflict Counsel after the time of need opens the issue that an Adversary Counsel is advising the Commissioners to ratify a mistake he made and after the fact a Conflict Counsel appears a month later which is suppose to make by his mere appearance makes everything legal. He does nothing but make an appearance. In addition, the commission's attorney represented that once the exceptions to the initial decision had been filed, the attorney general's office appointed conflicts counsel to advise the commission independently. Burneson has provided evidence just by the dates of appointment of Tom Roan February 4^th 2004. The false Order to Deny was issued by Director Campagnola on January 9^th 2004. To be correct Mr. Tom Roan had to be appointed Conflict Counsel before January 7, 2004 not a month later. The dead line for filing was January 5^th and the only attorney around was Mr. Foreman and thus he prepared the denial of extension requested by Burneson. Mr. Foreman is fast with legal forms for a Director to sign without authority. For the multiple time at this point Burneson’s rights to due process of law and a fair hearing by the Commissioners has been denied.

Burneson has provided no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, we conclude that Burneson has failed to demonstrate

any evidence of impropriety and, therefore, the order should not be set aside. See McCall, supra, 94 P.3d at 1272 (we are bound by record presented and may only consider arguments and assertions supported by evidence in record). The record is there with all needed evidence as stated in this petition but the Senor Judge Hume refused to acknowledge or maybe just read them entire record to make this a complete Appellant court decision.

To the extent that Burneson raises arguments relating to the ALJ's alleged prejudice against him, these arguments were not considered by the ALJ or the commission, and, therefore, we decline to consider them for the first time on appeal. See Negron, supra, 111 P.3d at 544. When the judicial industry decides to protect their legal system and hide the actions of judges and lawyers then the cost of this action is justice denied to the public. It’s the public who the system is suppose to be protecting not out of control lawyers running agencies in total violation of a defendants rights. ALJ Coughlin during the trial ordered Mr. Foreman to prepare a motion to charge Burneson with being the Alter Ego with his Company Denver 1500 Inc. This motion was prepared and filed by Mr. Foreman and is a part of the record but never approved by ALJ Coughlin because it would be evidence of her being prejudice against Burneson. This is evidenced in Burneson Opening Brief Exhibits G and H. the trial conducted by ALJ Coughlin was a mistrial and Burneson’s rights to due process of law was denied.

A. This decision by the Appellant Court is evidenced by the review of each mistaken representation by this court as to what the facts are and how a decision could be achieved when the ALC and the Commissioner’s actions are proven to not be impartial and independent but prejudiced by the actions of ALJ Coughlin’s during the trial and Mr. Foreman’s control over the Commissioners of the Real Estate Commission. New laws need to be set by this case. 1. There was no evidence Burneson intentionally missed the one day delivery. There is no evidence presented by the Commission that a severe case of the flue didn’t cause the delay in filing the Exceptions one day late. 2. The commission never inquired about this question of the flue since the Adversary Counsel decided the Motion would be denied without any questions. 3. Director Campagnola Order to deny was accepted by this Appellant Court as being within the scope of her authority which has been proven to be false.

B. The denial Burneson’s request for a two day extension to file his Exception was denied by Mr. Foreman not on the bases it was late but used as an excuse to deny the claims of Burneson from being entered by his completed Exceptions in the record. At this point a Conflict Counsel should have been appointed and wasn’t. Because one was not appointed Mr. Foreman exceeded his position as Adversary Counsel and prejudiced the Commissioner in his effort to correct his blunder that the Director Ordered the extension denied within two days of the reporting date. Neither Foreman nor the Director had the authority to issue any Order. Later this false Order had to be under a prejudicial compromise by the Commissioner to ratify Mr. Foreman’s illegal Order to deny the extension.

C. The Commissioners erred in denying Burneson his right to be heard by the commissioner to present his case. Mr. Foreman and previous counsel representing the Commission were granted access to the commissioners and no one in the history all though allowed by statute has ever been allowed to speak before a Commissioner's hearing. Burneson was denied his right to offer a settlement to the Commissioner in person by ALJ Coughlin. His offer to settle was presented by the Adversary Counsel behind close doors. The offer to settle was refused by the commissioners. New law a defendant in a trial by an agency must be granted his right to appear before the commission of that agency to present his case or present his offer of a settlement. The Attorney General’s Office runs all the agencies of the Colorado State Government through an ALC that is not accountable to anyone but the Attorney General’s Office.

D. After the order to seal was issued by District Judge Sylvester there was no evidence of any money lost, stolen by any one much less Broker Burneson. He doesn’t qualify for the claims of the Commission that he violated license law.

E. In review of the files of this case and the Appellant Courts decision it is readily apparent that Senior Judge Hume did not read the file in detail before issuing his Order. This also indicates the other Justices Taubman and Cararelli didn’t read this decision of Judge Hume’s before signing off on the Order. Somewhere in this Justice system the documents must be read by all Judges to grant a complete review of an appeal to give justice to the public. Hit and miss is not acceptable in appellant courts. This Appellant Order by Judge Hume is in err through out the Order.

Petitioner Burneson requests this court to grant approval of this Writ of Certiorari to correct the past miscarriage of justice from the ALC through the Real Estate Commission procedure that denied Petitioner due process of law and an impartial ALJ and impartial Hearings of the Commission. Included in this miscarriage of justice is the Colorado Appellant’s Order to Affirm the Commissioners Order to Revoke Mr. Burneson’s real estate licenses. This Court is requested to grant this Petition of Writ of Certiorari as the only means of bringing justice to a long list of misrepresentations and mistrial against Burneson which has wrongfully denied his real estate license and in turn denied his source of income. This Court is requested to reverse the Appellant Courts Order and to Order a reverse of the Commission’s order to revoke Burneson’s real estate license due to a mistrial conducted by ALJ Coughlin. This reversal of the Appellant Courts decision is also due to actions of Adversary Richard Foreman and Director Campagnola of the Real Estate Commission for issuing an unauthorized denial of an extension of one day to file Burneson’s Exceptions. This action prejudiced the Commission for any future reconsideration of this case. The Commissioners will not be impartial to correcting an action that they erred in ordering the revoking of Burneson’s license. This err was solely caused by the demands of an Attorney General’s Deputy Counsel. Miscarriage of Justice is evident through out this litigation and proves the system in place is not functioning as the State Legislature intended. Denial of this Petition will be a continuation of the miscarriage of justice against Burneson Petition Pro Se and future Respondents. New law is needed to correct these wrongs.

I certify a copy of this PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI was posted by U S Mail with sufficient postage to the addresses listed below on this day ____ of October 2005.